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SOME PROPERTY LAW ISSUES
IN THE LAW OF DISCLAIMERS
William P. LaPiana*
Editors' Synopsis: This Article discusses important property law ques-
tions that arise when trying to design a disclaimer statute such as what
property may be disclaimed, what happens to disclaimed property, and
when are disclaimers barred. The Article uses the relevant provisions of
the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act as illustrations, in the
belief that it exemplifies the latest consideration of the subject.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last twenty-five years the disclaimer has evolved. Although
its antecedents are venerable and its common law lineage well established,
it entered into a new phase of life with the enactment of Internal Revenue
Code ("Code") section 2518 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (the
"1976 Act").' The 1976 Act transformed the transfer tax system by
* William P. LaPiana is the Rita and Joseph Solomon Professor of Wills, Trusts, and
Estates at New York Law School. He holds A.B., A.M., J.D. and Ph.D. degrees from
Harvard University. A member of the ALI and an academic fellow of ACTEC, Professor
LaPiana is a member of the New York Bar and the executive committee of the Trusts and
Estates Section of the New York State Bar Association. He is also active in the Real
Property, Probate and Trust Section of the American Bar Asssociation.
See Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(b)(1), (e)(2), 90 Stat. 1520, 1893-96 (encompassing
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unifying the estate and gift taxes and creating the first version of the
generation skipping transfer tax. The disclaimer provision was occasioned
by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Keinath v.
Commissioner.2 In Keinath the court interpreted the relevant tax regula-
tions to make effective for tax purposes a disclaimer made within a reason-
able time after a future interest vested in possession.3 The Eighth Circuit
resolved the question by looking to state law to understand the meaning of
"reasonable time.",4 The Keinath court applied the "indefeasibly vested"
test from state property law only after failing to find a definition of reason-
able time in federal law. In so doing, the court acknowledged that "the
Commissioner has the right in the Treasury Regulations to set forth the
conditions under which disclaimers will be recognized,"5 and they need not
be based on state property law standards.6 Code section 2518 was designed
to provide a uniform federal rule of timeliness for a disclaimer that would
be effective for tax purposes, and, thus, would not result in a taxable
transfer by the disclaimant.7 The House Ways and Means Committee
Report specifically cited Keinath as an example of the lack of uniformity
created by the application of state law standards to the reasonable time
requirement under then existing laws.8
Code section 2518 requires that a "qualified disclaimer" be made
within nine months of the transfer creating the interest being disclaimed.9
However, the new statute did not stop there. Instead, it created several
additional requirements, including that the disclaimer be in writing, that the
disclaimant not have accepted any of the benefits of the disclaimed interest,
and that the interest pass "without any direction on the part of the person
making the disclaimer ' to someone other than the disclaimant or to the
transfers that create an interest in the disclaimant after December 31, 1976).
2 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
3 See id. See also former Treas. Reg. § 25.251 1-1(c) (as amended in 1997) (requiring
that a disclaimer be (1) recognized and "effective under the local law," (2) "made within a
reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer," (3) "unequivocal," and
(4) made prior to any acceptance of the disclaimed property by the disclaimant).
4 See Keinath, 480 F.2d at 61-62.51d. at 61.
6 See id. at 61-62.
7 See JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT of 1976, at 590 (1976).
8 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380, at 66 n. 4 (1976); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-06-080
(Nov. 14, 1977).
9 See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3) (as amended in 1997).
10 I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (2000).
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spouse of the decedent." Code section 2518 also includes rules for
disclaimers of less than an entire interest and of powers. 12 Even so, these
rules do not provide the last word.
Like so many aspects of our federal tax system, the qualified disclaimer
is a hybrid of state and federal law. While the common law of disclaimers
was not unknown, as the Keinath case shows, the requirements of Code
section 2518 led the states to codify their law of disclaimers in order to
provide some certainty for their residents who sought to make tax qualified
disclaimers. 3 After all, state law governs to whom disclaimed interests
pass, and state law provides the mechanisms for making sure the written
refusal to accept property is properly noted by the legal system. In short,
once the federal tax law dictated specific rules for disclaimers that the tax
law would recognize, the states began to codify their laws with the federal
law in mind.
The movement to codify state laws has been greatly influenced by the
various uniform acts on the topic promulgated by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"). The latest
expression of NCCUSL's views is the Uniform Disclaimer of Property
Interests Act ("UDOPIA") promulgated in 1999 and amended in 2002 to
reflect changes in the law of electronic documents. 14 In 2002 UDOPIA was
incorporated into the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") as Article 2, Part
1 I,' replacing former UPC section 2-801. UDOPIA exemplifies the bi-
polar nature of the disclaimer. 16 On one hand, disclaimers are tools of
transfer tax planning, and even if the sunset provisions of the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA") 17 are
repealed and the estate and generation skipping transfer taxes cease to exist
at midnight December 31, 2009, the gift tax and, therefore, section 2518
will continue in force. UDOPIA, therefore, was drafted to allow the full
range of disclaimers recognized under Code section 2518.18 On the other
hand, disclaimers are important aspects of property law in general. The
concept of disclaimer is often used to clarify the effect of other provisions
I See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(1), (3), (4) (2000).
12 See id. § 2518(c) (2000).
13 See Keinath, 480 F.2d 57.
14 See UDOPIA (amended 2002).
15 UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. II (amended 1993).
16 See UDOPIA (amended 2002).
17 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38 (2001).
18 See UDOPIA prefatory note (amended 2002).
SUMMER 2003
38 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
of law. In the UPC, for example, the rules of disclaimers govern the effects
of disinheritance' 9 and of statutory revocation by divorce.2° In some states,
a spouse who exercises elective share rights is treated as disclaiming
interests passing to the spouse by will. Finally, in many states, disclaimed
interests will not be subject to the claims of the disclaimant's creditors.
This Article discusses three important property law questions that arise
when trying to design a disclaimer statute and uses the relevant provisions
of UDOPIA as illustrations in the belief that UDOPIA exemplifies the
latest consideration of the subject. UDOPIA is the most recent attempt to
create a modern disclaimer statute and was designed to be part of the
Uniform Probate Code, which is widely regarded as embodying the most
up-to-date thought on the law governing succession to property at death.2
These three questions are (1) what property may be disclaimed, as exempli-
fied by jointly held property, (2) what happens to disclaimed property, and
(3) when are disclaimers barred. The resolution or lack of resolution of
these issues in UDOPIA illustrates the difficult task of creating a workable
disclaimer statute and highlights the importance of planning for disclaimers
in every estate plan.
II. ANALYSIS
A. What May be Disclaimed-Jointly Held Property
Federal tax law allows the qualified disclaimer of "an interest in
property ' '22 and states that "[a] power with respect to property shall be
treated as an interest in such property. 23 State disclaimer statutes usually
contain a laundry list of what may be disclaimed, giving rules which may
or may not give sufficient guidance to potential disclaimants. The most
important case in point is jointly held property, whether held as joint
tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants by the entirety. The
property law of these estates is complex and varies from state to state, but
under a traditional understanding of property law, a surviving joint tenant
or tenant by the entirety has nothing to disclaim. The theory of both forms
of ownership is that each tenant holds an undivided proportional interest
19 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 190 (Supp. 2002).
20 See id. § 2-804.
21 The author was the reporter for the UDOP1A. The opinions expressed in this article
are his alone and do not represent the views of NCCUSL or of any of the members of the
UDOPIA drafting committee.
22 I.R.C. § 2518(b) (2000).
23 Id. § 2518(c)(2) (2000).
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and when one tenant dies the survivors are simply freed of the participation
of that person. Nothing passes, therefore the tenant has nothing to dis-
claim.
However, American law has come a long way from the days in which
the courts reified common law concepts, especially common law property
concepts, to such a degree that they stood in the way of sound policy
judgments. The Iowa Supreme Court came to a sensible conclusion when
faced with the argument by state taxation authorities that a surviving joint
tenant could not disclaim on the death of the other joint tenant because no
transfer occurred at that time.24 The court stated:
While the [revenue] department's position fits neatly into the
traditional concepts of common law joint tenancy, we do not
believe these precepts bind us in our interpretation of the language
of the statute. When the legislature amended the statute to allow a
"transferee in joint tenancy" to disclaim a "transfer" of property, it
was referring to the accrual of additional rights and interest to the
surviving joint tenant which occurs upon the death of the other
joint tenant.25
However, such a reading of state law is not necessarily binding on the
United States Treasury. The ability to disclaim jointly held property is an
important issue because it seems that many, if not most, married couples
hold extensive property jointly, especially the family home. It often is
impossible to take advantage of the applicable exclusion amount at the
death of the first spouse to die because the decedent spouse does not have
sufficient probate property to fund a credit shelter vehicle. If the surviving
spouse could make a qualified disclaimer of the one-half of the family
home that does not pass but, in the words of the Iowa court, "accrues" to
the surviving spouse,26 the disclaimed interest could pass through the
decedent spouse's estate where it would be available to fund the credit
shelter vehicle. Litigation resulted and the courts uniformly held that a
surviving joint tenant could make a qualified disclaimer of the portion the
decedent would have received had the tenancy been severed during life.27
24 In re Estate of Lamoureux, 412 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Iowa 1987).
25 Id.
26 See id. at 632.
27 See Kennedy v. Comm'r, 804 F.2d 1332, 1336 (7th Cir. 1986); McDonald v.
Comm'r, 853 F.2d 1494, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988); Dancy v. Comm'r, 872 F.2d 84, 85 (4th Cir.
1989).
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These holdings provided little solace to tenants by the entirety, especially
if read to require the ability to sever unilaterally as the prerequisite to a
qualified disclaimer. Fortunately for taxpayers, the Internal Revenue
Service proposed new regulations to facilitate making qualified disclaimers
of jointly held property interests that became final on December 30, 1997
(the "Regulations").
28
The Regulations allow a surviving joint tenant or tenant by the entirety
to disclaim the "survivorship interest" to which the survivor succeeds by
operation of law on the death of the first joint tenant to die (the examples
identify this interest as one-half of the property when two joint tenants
exist).29 The qualified disclaimer can be made regardless of whether the
joint arrangement could be unilaterally severed under local law or the
disclaimant furnished consideration for the property. The Regulations also
create a special rule for joint tenancies between spouses created after July
14, 1988, in which the spouse of the donor is not a United States citizen.
The non-citizen surviving spouse may make a qualified disclaimer of any
portion of the joint interest that is included in the decedent's estate under
Code section 2040, which applies a contribution rule.3" Therefore, if the
surviving spouse contributed none of the consideration for the tenancy's
creation, he or she may make a qualified disclaimer of all the property.3
The Regulations also recognize the unique features of joint bank, broker-
age, and other investment accounts by allowing the survivor to make a
qualified disclaimer of that portion of the account contributed by the
decedent so long as the decedent could have regained that property by
unilateral action during life.32
Section 7 of UDOPIA accommodates state law to these rules by
allowing the surviving joint tenant or tenant by the entirety to disclaim the
decedent's proportional share of the property (referred to in the Regulations
as the "survivorship interest"). In the usual spousal joint arrangement, the
decedent spouse's proportional share is one-half. UDOPIA section 7 also
allows the disclaimer of all of the jointly held property not attributable to
consideration furnished by the disclaimant, if that portion is greater than
28 See T.D. 8744, 1998-1 C.B. 537.
29 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(4)(i), exs. (7) and (8) (as amended in 1997).
30 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a) (as amended in 1997) (valuing a decedent's gross
estate under section 2040 at death as the value of the property held jointly by decedent and
another person less the value attributed to consideration paid by other joint owners).
31 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(4)(ii) (as amended in 1997).
32 See id. § 25.2518-2(c)(4)(iii) (as amended in 1997).
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the proportional share. Thus, the special rule for non-citizen spouses is
accommodated. Finally, UDOPIA section 7(c) provides that the disclaimed
interest passes as if the disclaimant predeceased the decedent, thus sending
the property through the decedent's probate estate, where it will be avail-
able to fund a credit shelter disposition.33
These rules for the disclaimer of jointly held interests give surviving
joint holders of property great flexibility. However, like other property law
rules governing disclaimers, these rules are not default rules. The creator
or creators of a joint property arrangement cannot "draft around" these
rules, although perhaps a binding agreement could be entered into bargain-
ing away the right to disclaim.34 In addition, in some circumstances the
disclaimer by the survivor may not be wise despite potential tax benefits.
For example, in a jurisdiction that follows the lien theory of mortgage, the
death of a joint tenant mortgagor will extinguish a mortgage.35 If the
survivor disclaims, property that otherwise would be unencumbered will be
subject to the mortgage debt. Similarly, in many jurisdictions, a lease
entered into by one joint tenant-lessor will be extinguished at that lessor's
death. 36 A disclaimer by the survivor might very well revive the lease.
Finally, UDOPIA goes farther than the Regulations. Under UDOPIA
section 7(a), any surviving joint tenant may disclaim the greater of the
proportionate share or that part of the property not attributable to the
disclaimant's contribution.37 Under the Regulations, the contribution rule
only governs disclaimers made by a non-citizen spouse with respect to
certain joint tenancies and disclaimers of certain bank accounts or similar
arrangements. Therefore, under UDOPIA, a surviving citizen spouse could
disclaim all the family home if he or she did not contribute to its purchase,
but could make a qualified disclaimer under Code section 2518 of only
one-half of the property.
While these observations are commonplace, what they reveal about the
nature of UDOPIA and, indeed, of most disclaimer statutes is worth
emphasizing. Disclaimer statutes are permissive; they set forth what may
33 See UDOPIA § 7(c) (amended 2002).
34 Like most disclaimer statutes, UDOPIA § 5(a) (amended 2002) does not allow
unilateral action by the creator of an interest to limit the right to disclaim the interest.
35 See Harms v. Sprague, 473 N.E.2d 930,934 (111. 1984); Brant v. Hargrove, 632 P.2d
978, 984 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). But see Gen. Credit Co. v. Cleck, 609 A.2d 553, 557 (Pa.
Super. 1992).
36 See Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330, 335 (Cal. 1976); but see Alexander v. Boyer,
253 A.2d 359, 366 (Md. 1967).
37 See UDOPIA § 7(a) (amended 2002).
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be done and prescribe in greater or lesser detail the procedures for accom-
plishing those ends, but they do not provide guidance on deciding whether
what they authorize should be done. Those decisions can only be made by
the persons involved and almost always require the advice of a profes-
sional. While the regulations governing the disclaimer of jointly held
property were a victory for taxpayers and of real benefit to married couples
whose planning did not extend to the severance of joint tenancies, the
increase in the applicable exclusion amount under EGTRRA makes such
disclaimers less important as the concerns about overfunding the marital
deduction diminish.
B. What Happens to Disclaimed Property
1. In General
The rules for a qualified disclaimer under Code section 2518 require
that the disclaimed interest pass "without any direction on the part of the
person making the disclaimer."3 State disclaimer statutes make fulfilling
this requirement easy by providing rules that govern how disclaimed
interests pass, as well as rules that govern what might be called the collat-
eral effects of a disclaimer. Most statutes, including UDOPIA, make these
default rules, the significance of which is discussed at the end of this
section.
What should happen to disclaimed property? If the core idea of the
disclaimer is the requirement that a gift be accepted, then it might help to
look at the paradigmatic situation-the inter vivos gift. If the donee refuses
to accept the gift, the donor simply takes it back to do with it as she wishes.
In the situation where an intended beneficiary disclaims an interest passing
on the death of the donor, the equivalent would be to allow the donor's
arrangements to govern. The relevant arrangements are those that would
take effect should the beneficiary not be alive to take at the time of the
transfer. This would seem to be the origin of the almost universal statutory
provision, continued in UDOPIA, that disclaimed interests pass as if the
disclaimant had predeceased the creation of the interest (analogous to the
inter vivos offer). This is often referred to as the "deemed death" rule.
2. Present Interests
The deemed death rule is straightforward and easy to understand when
dealing with present interests-that is, interests which, but for the dis-
38 I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (2000).
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claimer, would pass to the disclaimant in outright immediate ownership. In
the simplest case of an outright gift under a will, the deemed death of the
disclaimant will implicate first the provisions of the will. As discussed
below, UDOPIA like most, if not all, disclaimer statutes, gives effect to a
provision of the document creating the interest that directs the passing of
the interest should it be disclaimed.39 In the absence of such a provision, a
testamentary gift will lapse. Under the common law, a gift in a will to a
beneficiary who predeceases the testator lapses, and therefore fails. If it is
a pre-residuary gift, it will pass to the residuary takers, and if a residuary
gift lapses, it will pass in intestacy. Every jurisdiction, however, has some
version of an antilapse statue. While these statutes vary in detail, they
usually provide that a gift in a will to a beneficiary who is related to the
testator and who predeceases the testator does not lapse but passes instead
to the beneficiary's issue, if any, so long as the will does not provide
otherwise. The degree of relationship to the testator required to invoke the
statute varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and the degree of specificity
needed to "provide otherwise" often is not completely clear. The UPC
antilapse statute applies to gifts to grandparents and descendants of grand-
parents of the testator, but it requires that the intent to override its provi-
sions must be more than a requirement that the beneficiary survive the
testator.4n
Once we move beyond the law of wills, the situation is even more
uncertain. Although the UPC does contain antilapse provisions that apply
to non-probate transfers, few, if any of the states that have not adopted the
UPC provision have similar statutes."' For example, if the designated
beneficiary of an insurance policy on the life of the decedent disclaims the
interest, there may be a contingent beneficiary, but if there is no contingent
beneficiary, the death benefit is likely to pass to the decedent's estate.
There probably is even less certainty about the effect of disclaimers of
beneficiary designations under payable on death and transfer on death
arrangements. In some instances, the documents governing these arrange-
ments may not allow for the designation of alternate beneficiaries. In many
39 See UDOPIA § 6(b)(2) (amended 2002) ("The disclaimed interest passes according
to any provision in the instrument creating the interest providing for the disposition of the
interest, should it be disclaimed, or of disclaimed interests in general.").
40 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b)(3) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 190 (Supp.
2002). This particular provision is a change from prevailing law and has proved to be
controversial. See Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better or
More Like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1993).
41 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-706 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 190 (Supp. 2002).
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others, creators of these arrangements will not have taken advantage of the
opportunities for planning that these documents provide. The UPC provi-
sions at least provide some certainty, and because UDOPIA was designed
to operate as part of the UPC, it does not provide any guidance beyond the
deemed death rule. Superficially then, UDOPIA does not address these
questions and, in that regard, resembles almost all other disclaimer statutes.
The difference is that UDOPIA does not need to address these issues.
Jurisdictions adopting UDOPIA may be lulled into ignoring this shortcom-
ing in their current statutes, but unless they have adopted the relevant UPC
provision, the application of the deemed death rule to testamentary substi-
tutes may not be at all clear.
3. Future Interests
Another uncertainty occurs when applying the deemed death rule to the
disclaimer of a future interest. Assume that T's will creates a testamentary
trust for A, who is to receive all the income for life. At A's death, the trust
is to be distributed to T's descendants by representation. A is survived by
7's son S and daughter D. S has two living children and D has one child.
S decides that he would prefer his share of the trust to pass to his children
and disclaims.4 2 Under many existing disclaimer statutes, including the
former UPC provision section 2-801, the interest passes as ifS had prede-
ceased T. A problem can arise if children born after 7's death survive S.
One possible argument is that, had S predeceased T, the afterborn children
would not exist and that D and S's two children living at the time of 's
death are entitled to all of the trust property.
There appears to be no judicial resolution of the problem, but UDOPIA
avoids it by having the deemed death of the disclaimant occur not before
the creation or transfer of the disclaimed interest, but immediately before
the time of distribution of the interest.43 Time of distribution is defined as
"the time when a disclaimed interest would have taken effect in possession
or enjoyment." 44 "Possession" and "enjoyment," are, of course, terms of
art from the law of future interests describing the time at which it is certain
to whom property belongs and the time at which that person will have the
property in hand. The terms do not necessarily mean that the person
actually has the property in hand. For example, the time of distribution of
42 If the disclaimer is to be a qualified disclaimer for tax purposes it must be made
within nine months of 7s death. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3) (as amended in 1997).
43 See UDOPIA § 6(b)(3)(A) (amended 2002).
44 UDOPIA § 6(a)(l) (amended 2002).
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present interests created by will and all interests arising under the law of
intestate succession is the date of the decedent's death. At that moment,
the heir or devisee is entitled to his or her devise or share. The fact that
time will pass before the will is admitted to probate and actual receipt of
the gift may not occur until the administration of the estate is complete is
irrelevant. The time of distribution of present interests created by a
nontestamentary instrument generally depends on when the instrument
becomes irrevocable. Because the recipient of a present interest is entitled
to the property as soon as the gift is made, the time of distribution occurs
when the creator of the interest can no longer take it back. The time of
distribution of a future interest is the time when all preceding interests have
ended, and the future interest comes into possession or enjoyment as
described above. In the example above, under UDOPIA, S would be
deemed to have died immediately before A's death, which is the time that
the remainder will come into possession. Therefore, S's children living at
the time of distribution, whenever born, are entitled to the share of the trust
property S would have received.45
However a problem still arises when the disclaimed interest is vested
in interest when created. For example, Tcreates a testamentary trust to pay
the income to A for life, remainder in equal shares to T's son S and daugh-
ter D. Because no explicit requirement exists which states that S must
survive A to receive his share of the remainder, S's interest is said to be
vested in interest. If S dies during A's lifetime, his share of the remainder
is simply an asset of his estate. As in the example above, S has two living
children and D has one living child. S would prefer that his share of the
remainder pass to his children on A's death. Under the statutes that apply
the deemed death rule, S has predeceased T and therefore S cannot receive
the remainder interest; however, if the relevant antilapse statute applies to
future interests, S's share of the remainder passes to his issue, which is the
result he wants. Under UDOPIA, S is deemed to have died immediately
before A, at which time S did own the remainder interest and his death
before A did not divest him of that interest. Where should it go? Again,
UDOPIA provides an answer through other provisions of the UPC. Section
2-707 creates an antilapse rule for interests in trusts that in essence requires
all holders of future interests to survive to the time the interest is to come
45 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 282(a) (West 2002); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trust Law
§ 2-1.11(d) (McKinney 1998) (containing similar provisions that result in a similar
outcome).
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into possession.4 6 In other words, all interests become contingent on
survival to the time of possession. Thus, in the example in this paragraph,
the disposition of S's remainder is dictated by the statute and in this case
would pass to his living descendants. 47 Absent UPC section 2-707 or a
provision like it, any state adopting UDOPIA must provide for the passing
of disclaimed vested interests.
A gap remains in the UDOPIA provision, even taking into account
UPC section 2-707. The UPC provision applies only to interests in trusts.
The rationale is stated in the Comment to the section:
The rationale for restricting this section to future interests under
the terms of a trust is that legal life estates in land, followed by
indefeasibly vested remainder interests, are still created in some
localities, often with respect to farmland. In such cases, the legal
life tenant and the person holding the remainder interest can,
together, give good title in the sale of the land. If the antilapse
idea were injected into this type of situation, the ability of the
parties to sell the land would be impaired if not destroyed because
the antilapse idea would, in effect, create a contingent substitute
remainder interest in the present and future descendants of the
person holding the remainder interest.4"
The reasoning of this comment is persuasive, but the result is a gap in
UDOPIA. In order to provide properly for the passing of disclaimed vested
interests, any state adopting the uniform statute should provide the follow-
ing in the first sentence of section 6(b)(3)(A): the disclaimed interest
"passes as if the disclaimant had died intestate immediately before the time
of distribution. 4 9 The addition of the word "intestate" will have no effect
on the passing of contingent interests because the holder of the contingent
future interests loses all claim to the interest when he or she fails to fulfill
the contingency (here, surviving to the time of distribution), but will
provide a certain disposition for vested interests. In the example above, if
S makes the disclaimer, the trust remainder will pass to his children (and if
he makes a qualified disclaimer there will be no gift tax on the transaction).
The simple addition of the word intestate to the statute will in most states
46 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707(b)(1) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 194 (Supp.
2002 17 See id.
48 Id. § 2-707(b)(1) cmt. at 197.
49 Cf UDOPIA § 6(b)(3)(A) (amended 2002) (excluding the "intestate" language).
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pass part of the remainder to S's spouse because a surviving spouse is
almost always an heir. Indeed, in most modern intestacy statutes, a
surviving spouse takes a fixed amount of the intestate estate before other
heirs have any claim. Under such statutes, the spouse's share might
completely absorb the disclaimed interest. Adding "intestate and unmar-
ried" to the statute would prevent the spouse from taking any part of the
remainder, which might very well comport with the intent of most
disclaimants. If the disclaimant wishes the spouse to receive part of the
remainder, a partial disclaimer could be made passing the disclaimed
portion to the heirs other than the spouse and the gift tax marital deduction
could be used to make a tax-free gift to the spouse.
In the absence of a modification of the statute, what will become of a
disclaimed vested interest? Helpful precedent is difficult to imagine. The
traditional law of future interests is unanimous: the holder of a vested
interest who dies before the interest has vested in possession (before the
"distribution date" in the language of UDOPIA) 50 has an asset that passes
through the holder's estate. A tenuous argument exists concerning a
resulting trust that states where a trust fails to dispose of an interest, that
interest should pass back to the creator of the trust. The argument is weak
because when the trust itself does not dispose of a disclaimed interest, the
statute dictates that the interest pass as if the disclaimant died immediately
before the time of distribution. The only way to make sense of that
requirement is to pass the interest through the disclaimant's estate, and the
only possible source for the terms of distribution of the estate is intestacy
law. It arguably would be possible to rely on an executed will, but how
could a will be given any effect without being admitted to probate, which
presumably cannot be done if the disclaimant is only "pretend dead?"
Perhaps in one of the few states that allow ante mortem probate one could
actually admit the will to probate and use the will's residuary clause to
dispose of the disclaimed interest. The difficulty with that solution,
assuming availability, is that using the disclaimant's will to dispose of the
disclaimed interest probably would make it impossible to make a qualified
disclaimer because the interest would not pass "without any direction on
the part of the person making the disclaimer."'" The only difficulty in the
intestacy solution is the possible passing of a portion or even all of the
disclaimed interest to the disclaimant's spouse, as noted above.
50 See UDOPIA § 6(a) (amended 2002).
51 I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (2000).
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4. Acceleration of Remaining Interests
Consider a testamentary trust under which the decedent's child receives
income for life and on the child's death the trust terminates and is distrib-
uted to the child's descendants by representation. The child makes a tax
qualified disclaimer within nine months of the decedent's death. If the
deemed death rule is applied literally, the child is deemed to have prede-
ceased the parent, and the trust will terminate at the parent's death with the
remainder coming into possession of the child's descendants who survive
the parent. However, without the disclaimer, the remainder could certainly
come into possession in persons who are not yet born at the time the
disclaimer is made. Cases that state that the remainder interests come
directly from the testator in this example and are unaffected by the dis-
claimer provide an argument that the trust should not terminate, but rather
it should continue until the disclaimant actually dies. The question is
further clouded by cases dealing with the treatment of the remainder when
the life beneficiary relinquishes the income interest. These cases generally
hold that the intent of the testator should decide whether the remainders
accelerate, resulting in the termination of the trust.5" In New York the
question was complicated by the well-established doctrine of the indestruc-
tibility of spendthrift trusts with the result that litigation on the question
was not unusual.53
In 1971 the New York legislature settled the matter by enacting Estate
Powers & Trust Law § 2- 1. 11 (d), which provides that unless the creator of
the disclaimed interest provides otherwise, the disclaimer has the effect of
accelerating the possession and enjoyment of subsequent interests.
54
Today, many state statutes as well as UDOPIA have similar language,
although unlike many of the state statues, UDOPIA, like former UPC
section 2-801, does not condition the application of the acceleration
provision on the creator of the disclaimed interest not having provided
otherwise. 5
The application of an acceleration provision is well illustrated by In re
52 See Ohio Nat'l Bank of Columbus v. Adair, 374 N.E.2d 415,417 (Ohio 1978); see
generally Annotation, Relinquishment of Interest by Life Beneficiary in Possession as
Accelerating Remainder of Which There is Substitutional Gift in Case Primary
Remainderman Does Not Survive Life Beneficiary, 7 A.L.R.4th 1084 (1981).
53 See, e.g., In re Estate of Chadbourne, 401 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (Sur. Ct. 1977).54 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11 (d) (McKinney 1998).
55 See UDOPIA § 6(b)(4) (amended 2002).
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Estate of Gilbert. 6 Gilbert's will created a discretionary trust for his son
and his son's issue.57 The remainder of the trust was payable to the son's
issue. 8 At the time of the testator's death, the son had no issue.5 9 The son
disclaimed all his interest in the trust out of religious convictions about the
evils of material wealth.60 The executors of Mr. Gilbert's will argued that,
while there was no explicit provision in the will providing for anything
other than acceleration, one should be implied.6' The Surrogate refused to
do so, holding that the legislature had definitively rejected a search for
intent in each document.62 As a result, the remainders were accelerated,
and because the disclaimant had no issue, the trust passed to the alternative
remainders, which were similar trusts for the testator's other children.63
The son's future children were forever cut off from their grandfather's
bounty.64 As harsh as that result is, it is not unusual. Courts generally
apply the concept of acceleration rigorously as the default rule, whether it
is stated in the disclaimer statute or as a matter of common law, 65 and even
where the disclaimant may be motivated by the opportunity for manipula-
tion presented by the acceleration rule.
A desire to manipulate the distribution of trust property may have
motivated the disclaimer involved in Pate v. Ford.66 Mrs. Pate's will
created a trust for each of her two sons as life beneficiaries, with the
remainder to go to all of her grandchildren.67 At the time of her death, one
son, Wallace, had five children, and the other, Billy, had none.68 Wallace
disclaimed his interest in his trust.69 If the remainders accelerated, his
children would be guaranteed the corpus of their father's trust and would
not have to share it with any future children of Billy.70 The relevant statute
stated that the disclaimed interest devolved according to the deemed death
56 592 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sur. Ct. 1992).




61 See id. at 227-28.
62 See id. at 228.
63 See id. at 225, 228.
64 See id. at 227.
65 See Weinstein v. Mackey, 408 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
66 376 S.E.2d 775 (S.C. 1989).
67 See id. at 776.
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 777.
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rule unless the instrument creating the disclaimed interest contained
another disposition in event of disclaimer.7 The South Carolina Supreme
Court overturned the lower court's ruling that the provision in the will
terminating the trust on Wallace's death was "another disposition."7
Because the court found that Mrs. Pate's will did not contain an alternative
disposition in the event of Wallace's disclaiming, the court held that
Wallace's disclaimer accelerated his remaindermen's interest and the
property rights vested in them accordingly.73
The result in Pate is the usual one.74 However, a few courts have
strained to find some language that shows the creator of the disclaimed
interest provided otherwise and therefore prevented acceleration. Two
decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court have all but read the acceleration
rule out of existence. Wetherbee v. First State Bank & Trust Co.75 and
Linkous v. Candler76 both state that the intent to prevent acceleration can be
implied from the document creating the interest and both find that the fact
that the remainders are contingent on surviving the disclaiming life income
beneficiary indicates the requisite intent.77 As the opinion in Gilbert makes
clear, the acceleration rule was intended to allow the acceleration of
contingent remainders.7 8 Thus, the very fact of contingency should not
prevent acceleration. The Wetherbee case simply is an example of a
tortured route to an appealing result. That case involved a testamentary
trust for the testator's widow, which, on her death, was to divide into
subtrusts for their two sons.7 9 If a son predeceased his mother, his interest
was to pass to his unmarried widow and his surviving descendants.8" The
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id. See also Patricia J. Roberts, The Acceleration ofRemainders: Manipulating
the Identity of the Remaindermen, 42 S.C. L. REv. 295 (1991 ). Prof. Roberts suggests that
a distinction be drawn between acceleration and indefeasibility, and that the proper solution
to a case such as Pate v. Ford is to give the income to the remaindermen living from time
to time, but to vest the remainder indefeasibly and terminate the trust only at the time
provided for by the creator of the trust. Id. at 318-22; see also supra text accompanying
note 84.
74 See Roberts, supra note 73, at 304-05.
75 466 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 1996).
76 508 S.E.2d 657, 658 (Ga. 1998).
77 See Wetherbee, 466 S.E.2d at 836; Linkous, 508 S.E.2d at 658-59.
78 See 592 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
79 See Wetherbee, 466 S.E.2d at 836.
80 See id.
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sons disclaimed their interests shortly after their father's death.8 ' By the
time of their mother's death they both had divorced.12 Their ex-wives
claimed they were entitled to an interest in the trusts because the sons were
deemed to have predeceased their father under the disclaimer statute and,
therefore, both women were surviving unmarried wives.13 Under UDOPIA
section 6(b)(4), the problem would not arise. The sons would be deemed
to have predeceased their mother, at which time, of course, their ex-wives
were not their surviving unmarried widows.
The acceleration rule has been criticized principally because, when
applied to a situation like that in Pate, it allows the disclaimant to manipu-
late the identity of the remainder beneficiaries.8 4 One of the critics suggests
a statutory solution:
Legislatures can enact statutes providing that in the case of a
disclaimer, release, conveyance, or other event that has the effect
of ending the life estate while the life tenant is alive, when the
identity of the remaindermen is to be ascertained at the death of the
life tenant, the property should be held in trust for the benefit of
the remaindermen. The statute also should specify that the income
is to be paid out from time to time to those who fit the identity of
the remaindermen at the time. This would apply to a remainder that
is contingent (to A for life, then to A's surviving children), vested
subject to open (to A for life, then to A's children), or vested
subject to divestment (to A for life, then to A's children, the issue
of any deceased child to take the parent's share). Additionally,
disclaimer statutes should be amended to make it clear that acceler-
ation will not occur without indefeasibility. 5
The practical difficulties with this solution are many. First, it does not
address the situation in which no presumptive remaindermen are living,
like the situation in In re Estate of Gilbert.6 If the trust provides income to
A for life, then to A's issue and A disclaims without issue, the income




84 See Adam J. Hirsch, Revisions in Need of Revising: The Uniform Disclaimer of
Property Interests Act, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 170-75 (2001); see also Roberts, supra
note 73, at 300.
85 Roberts, supra note 73, at 321-22.
86 592 N.Y.S.2d 224.
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A's interest is a mandatory interest in income and a discretionary one in
principal? The disclaimer turns the present beneficial interest into one in
income only. Enough has been written about the disadvantages of the
traditional definitions of income and principal and the uses of the total
return trust that it seems wrong to replace the transferor's attempt to give
the present beneficiary an interest that can overcome the limitations of the
traditional principal and income rule, with an interest rammed into the
income-only straightjacket. 7 Perhaps the statute should give the presump-
tive remaindermen exactly the interest that was disclaimed. Of course, a
trustee who was happy enough to exercise discretion on behalf of A might
balk at having to deal with a different set of beneficiaries. No trust will fail
for want of a trustee, but now the transferor has a trust she did not create,
managed by a trustee she did not choose. Finally, when should the statute
apply? Arguably, the identity of the remaindermen will be affected by any
disclaimer. Even where the remainder is indefeasibly vested, the
remainderman's death before the death of the life income beneficiary will
pass the remainder through the remainderman's estate to persons who are
certainly not the remainderman (putting aside the traditional view that a
person's estate is that person).
In short, crafting a provision that will be a useful substitute for the
acceleration rule is not a simple task. UDOPIA takes the position that
experience and policy point to the acceleration rule as the best solution.88
Once again, however, the acceleration rule is a default rule, albeit a strong
one. Like the old UPC section 2-801 and unlike many state statutes,
including the New York statute applied in In re Estate of Gilbert,89
UDOPIA section 6(b)(4) does not condition acceleration on the creator of
the disclaimed interest not having "provided otherwise."9 Omission of a
provide-otherwise provision eliminates any need to investigate the intent of
the creator of the interests, but the omission does not preclude a conscious
choice to prevent application of the acceleration rule. The only safe route
to overriding the acceleration rule, whatever the applicable disclaimer
87 If the trust is governed by state law that allows conversion to a unitrust, the
straightjacket can be escaped (see, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.4
(McKinney 2003), but it would be less than respectful of the creator of the trust's intent to
replace a carefully drafted trust with a statutory substitute that may not function as well, all
in the name of preserving that very intent.
88 See UDOPIA § 6 (amended 2002).
89 See 592 N.Y.S.2d 224 (applying N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.1 1(d)
(McKinney 2003).
90 See UDOPIA § 6 (amended 2002).
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statute provides, is to provide for the disposition of the trust income for the
period of the life beneficiary's natural life in the event the life beneficiary
disclaims. The existence of the successor interest will prevent acceleration
of the remainder.
The questions about the passing of a disclaimed interest illustrate a
second lesson for practitioners: drafting must take the possibility of
disclaimers into account. All the passing rules in UDOPIA are default
rules and, in some cases, are actually double default rules because they
ultimately rely on the default rules of the antilapse statutes. As noted
above, antilapse statutes vary from state to state both in substance and in
requirements for overriding their provisions. The lesson is that every
document should expressly provide for the disposition of a gift should a
beneficiary predecease the effective date of the instrument making the gift.
In less abstract terms, a will should expressly provide for the disposition of
any specific or general bequest should the beneficiary predecease the
testator, and the residuary clause should be drafted to make survivorship
requirements unambiguous. 9' The same consideration applies to the
possibility of disclaimers. Just as the lawyer should ascertain the client's
desires in the event a beneficiary does not survive, so should the lawyer
ascertain the client's desires in the event the beneficiary disclaims. In
many cases the result will be the addition of a few words to the will such as
the following: "and should X predecease me or disclaim this bequest, I
give [the subject of the bequest] to [the alternative taker]." In some cases,
such as with the will of Peter Gilbert, disruption of the estate plan can be
avoided. 92 Had Mr. Gilbert's lawyers thought about the possibility that
Mr. Gilbert's son would disclaim his bequest, they could have drafted for
that contingency and preserved the trust for the son's possible issue,
assuming, of course, that Mr. Gilbert would have desired that result.
93
C. When are Disclaimers Barred
The simple question-can I disclaim this interest or not?-does not
have an equally simple answer. As might be expected, the answer depends
on why the question is being asked. If the goal is to make a tax qualified
91 For a recent example of the difficulties that can arise see Polen v. Baker, 752 N.E.2d
258, 259 (Ohio 2001), where a gift to five named people "equally share and share alike,....
or to the survivors thereof' was held by a divided court to be a gift per capita to those who
survived the testator, which evidenced an intention to override the anti-lapse statute.
92 See In re Estate of Gilbert, 592 N.Y.S.2d 224.
93 See id. at 224.
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disclaimer, the answer must be found in Code section 2518. If the potential
disclaimant is not concerned about the tax effects of the disclaimer, the
answer must be found in state law, although, as noted below, even that
statement must now be qualified.
1. Tax Qualified Disclaimers
A disclaimer may not qualify for favorable tax treatment under Code
section 2518 because it is made too late,94 the disclaimant already has
accepted the interest,95 or the disclaimant has received consideration for the
disclaimer.96 The origin of the time limit has been discussed above.97 Note
that the nine-month period runs from the date of the transfer creating the
interest. 98 This means that even the most contingent interest must be
disclaimed within nine months of its creation if the disclaimer is to qualify
for favorable tax treatment under Code section 2518. 99 The other require-
ments overlap the state disclaimer statutes to some degree. Because a
disclaimer is a refusal to accept, an acceptance will bar a disclaimer. A
federal law of acceptance has developed as a result of Code section 2518.00
The most dramatic single case, perhaps, is Estate of Monroe v. Commis-
sioner' in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
"no consideration" requirement was limited to bargained-for consideration
in a strict contract law sense. 0 ' The court refused to disqualify disclaimers
made of interests in a decedent's estate when evidence showed that the
decedent's husband, who had made gifts to the disclaimants in the past, led
them to understand that they would be provided for or their needs taken
into account. 0 3 In retrospect, the permissive view of the Fifth Circuit,
94 See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2) (2000).
95 See id. § 2518(b)(3) (2000).
96 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1997) (stating that the acceptance
of consideration for making the disclaimer is an acceptance of the benefits of the disclaimed
property).
9 See supra note 7, and accompanying text.
98 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1997).
99 Although the Committee Report emphasizes the need for a uniform time period, it
fails to state a rationale for the requirement that a beneficiary without knowledge of a
transfer must disclaim within nine months.
100 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d) (as amended in 1997) and especially the examples
at -2(d)(4), which deal with acceptance at length.
124 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1997).
102 See id. at 708-09; see also Estate of Lute v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D.
Neb. 1998).
10 3 See id. at 711-15.
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accompanied by language approving the use of disclaimers to avoid
transfer taxes and preserve family wealth, foreshadows the shift in attitudes
that led to EGTRRA and its (albeit transient) repeal of the estate tax.
2. Non-tax Disclaimers
From the beginning of the modem era of disclaimers with the enact-
ment of Code section 2518, most state disclaimer statutes, as well as the
uniform laws, did not exactly track the federal law. Most obviously, the
time limit was different. Most of these statutes allowed a beneficiary to
disclaim a future interest within nine months of its vesting.'I° This lack of
congruity between state and federal law left open the potential for mischief.
The nine month period looks like that of federal law, but, of course, when
applied to the disclaimer of future interests it is a very different nine-month
period. 05 UDOPIA eliminates any time limit for making a disclaimer and
section 13 lists acts and events that bar a disclaimer. 106 The most important
is section 13(b)(1), which bars the disclaimant from making a disclaimer of
an interest the disclaimant has accepted.' °7 Whether or not actions by the
disclaimant amount to an acceptance is a fact-specific inquiry. When the
disclaimant has actually taken possession or formal title to the property, the
disclaimer is likely to be barred. An example of this scenario is found in In
re Will of Hall.'0 8 In that South Carolina case, the decedent's will devised
104 See, e.g., UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS BY WILL, INTESTACY OR APPOINTMENT
ACT § 2(a) (1978) ("An instrument disclaiming a future interest shall be delivered not later
than [nine] months after the event that determines that the taker of the property or interest
has become finally ascertained and his interest indefeasibly vested."); see also former UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-801(b)(1) (amended 1993), 8 UL.A. 190 (1998) (requiring that "the
disclaimer must be filed .... if of a future interest, not later than [nine] months after the
event determining that the taker of the property or interest is finally ascertained and his
interest is indefeasibly vested"); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11 (a)(2)(C)
(McKinney 1998) (stating "the effective date of a disposition which is of a future estate
shall be the date on which it becomes an estate in possession"); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11 (b)(2) (McKinney 1998) (requiring filing of the renunciation within
nine months of the effective date).
105 In fact, the various uniform acts recognized this dichotomy. The placing of the
number of months in brackets in the uniform acts (see supra note 104) indicates that the
nine-month period was only a suggestion. A legislature enacting a model act could choose
a different limit. The 1978 uniform acts contained a provision creating a nine months from
the date of transfer rule for disclaimers intended as "qualified disclaimers" under Code
section 2518(b)(2) (2000).
106 See UDOPIA § 13 (amended 2002).
107 See id. § 13B(b)(l) (amended 2002).
'08 456 S.E.2d 439 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
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real estate, including her house, to her daughter for her life, and a remain-
der to the daughter's children living at the daughter's death.'0 9 The
daughter and her siblings were co-executors." ° Eight months after the
decedent's death, the executors executed a deed conveying the real estate
to the daughter and on that same day, the daughter executed a receipt and
release acknowledging receipt of the life estate."' Shortly thereafter the
daughter listed the property for sale with a real estate agent and described
herself as the owner." 2 Four days before the nine month anniversary of
decedent's death, the daughter filed a document entitled "disclaimer" with
the probate court." 3 South Carolina law incorporates the federal require-
ments for a qualified disclaimer, including the requirement that the
disclaimant not have accepted the property." 4 The court upheld a lower
court ruling that the daughter had accepted the property by exercising
dominion and control over it, "most notably by listing it for sale in her own
name as seller."'"15
The result in Hall certainly seems justified. Although the daughter
may not have used her life estate by living in the house, she acted like an
owner in offering the property for sale." 6 Although not cited in the Hall
case, the court in In re Estate of Gates,"7 after noting that "legal precedent
on these issues is sparse,""' 8 defined acceptance in a way that completely
comports with the holding in Hall. "Acceptance, as that term has come to
be used in both the traditional and the legal senses, connotes an act of
voluntarily receiving something or consensually acceding to it. Implicit in
the voluntariness of the act is the right and ability to reject that which is
proffered."'' 9 In Gates, the court did not find an acceptance barring a
renunciation (the term used in the New York statutes) where a minor,
accused of murdering his father and other family members, was the
beneficiary of funds advanced from his father's estate that were used for





114 See id. at 441.
1'5 Id. at 441.
116 See Hall, 456 S.E.2d at 441.
117 596 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
118 Id.
"19 Id.
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his defense against the murder charges.120 The advancement was made
when no guardian had been appointed for the minor to accept the advance-
ment on the minor's behalf.' 21 In fact, the advancement was decided upon
by the estate beneficiaries. 122 Furthermore, after a guardian was appointed,
"the guardian paid back the advanced sums to the estate in full.'
123
Even when a disclaimant's actions fit the language from Gates, the
actions might not amount to an acceptance. In Jordan v. Trower, the
decedent's granddaughter, the only beneficiary of his will, disclaimed all of
her interest in the decedent's estate.124 The executors refused to honor the
disclaimer, arguing that by accepting $460 from the estate before the will
was admitted to probate, the granddaughter was barred from disclaiming. 1
25
The executors disbursed the money to the granddaughter to enable her to
buy clothes to wear to the decedent's funeral and pay other expenses.
126
The court allowed the disclaimer, stating:
In the case at bar, the beneficiary merely received a de minimis
sum from the estate prior to the filing of the will for probate. She
did not obtain, nor even seek, possession of the property of the
estate as a whole and undertook no actions that would indicate an
intention to assert an ownership interest in the property of the
estate. 127
Taken together, Gates and Jordan emphasize the voluntary and
knowing aspect of acceptance and Jordan seems to create a de minimis
exception for using a small part of interest later disclaimed. Of course, the
facts of both cases cannot be ignored. In Gates the disclaimant was a
minor and incapable of legally accepting the advance from the estate.
128
The money was clearly used for a most pressing need, and his guardian
eventually reimbursed the estate. 29 In Jordan, the disclaimant was twenty
years old, did not seek the small distribution from the estate, but accepted




124 See 431 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
125 See id. at 162.
126 See id.
127 Id.
128 See Gates, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 197-98.
129 See id. at 198.
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the distribution to enable her to attend the decedent's funeral. 3 ° Her
disclaimer would result in the estate passing to her mother as sole heir. 3 '
In addition, the disclaimant testified that she made the disclaimer believing
that the result reflected the decedent's true wishes better than the will
executed shortly before death. It should be noted that the mother's caveat
to the will (requesting the trustees and executors under the will to relin-
quish the estate to her as the heir at law) was rejected.'
Perhaps the most extensive application of a broad concept of exercise
of dominion amounting to an acceptance is Badouh v. Hale. '33 In Hale, the
daughter signed a deed of trust and real estate lien note in favor of an
attorney who had performed legal services for the daughter for which he
had not been paid.'34 The deed of trust included a provision in which the
daughter conveyed "her expectancy in her mother's home" to secure the
note. 35 Several years later, the mother died with a will that specifically
devised her home to the daughter.' To prevent the home from being
subject to the daughter's creditors, the daughter disclaimed her interest in
her mother's estate under Texas Probate Code section 37A.13 7 On a motion
for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the daughter's
disclaimer was invalid and ineffective because the daughter had exercised
dominion and control over the property when she executed the deed of trust
and note in favor of the attorney.13 The appellate court reversed and held
that the daughter's disclaimer may be effective and, thus, summary judg-
ment was improperly granted. 139 The court reasoned that the daughter
could not have exercised dominion and control over the property because
she was not entitled to the property until the mother's death.' 40 The Texas
statute bars a disclaimer if the beneficiary has accepted the property, and
the daughter was not a beneficiary because she had no more than an
expectancy. "'
130 See Jordan, 431 S.E.2d at 162.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See 22 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. 2000).
134 See id. at 393.




139 See id. at 395.
140 See id. at 394.
141 See id. at 393.
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The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, and held that the daughter
accepted the property because she exercised dominion and control over the
property by using her expectancy in the property as collateral. 14 2 Accord-
ingly, the daughter could not validly disclaim the property. 143 The court
rejected the argument that the daughter could not have the status as a
beneficiary under Texas Probate Code section 37A until the mother's
death.'" Section 37A's definition of beneficiary is non-exclusive and thus
is "broad enough to include expectants under a will.'
145
The application of UDOPIA to the facts of Badouh v. Hale should lead
to the same result. UDOPIA section 13(b)(2) bars the disclaimer if"[t]he
disclaimant voluntarily assigns, conveys, encumbers, pledges, or transfers
the interest sought to be disclaimed or contracts to do So. ' ' 146 The daugh-
ter's actions with regard to the house certainly amount to encumbering or
pledging. '47 The only question is whether the expectancy in the property is
the same interest as the property itself. The answer should be yes. The
pledge of the expectancy has value only in reference to the property the
disclaimant is expecting to receive. In addition, the Texas Supreme Court's
finding that the daughter had accepted the property by exercising dominion
and control is equally applicable to an attempted disclaimer under
UDOPIA.'14 Finally, the creditor relied on the pledge of the expectancy
and, therefore, an argument that the daughter should be estopped from
undoing that pledge by rejecting the property can be made under any
disclaimer statute.
These few cases show the concept of acceptance is manipulable and its
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 394.
145 Id. at 396. But see In re Estate of Baird, 933 P.2d 1031 (Wash. 1997) (An
expectancy could not be disclaimed because, like the Texas statute, RCW 11.86 describes
a disclaimer as a refusal by a beneficiary to accept an interest. An expectancy does not
make the person who anticipates receiving the property a beneficiary, nor is the expectancy
an interest.). The disclaimant in Baird was trying preserve his mother's estate from a
judgment in a personal injury action arising from his brutal assault on his wife, for which
he was sentenced to 20 years in prison. See id. at 1032-33. Under UDOPIA § 6(b)(1), the
disclaimer of an interest in property becomes effective as of the time the instrument creating
the interest becomes irrevocable, in this instance, at the mother's death. Thus, an
"anticipatory" disclaimer simply is not possible under UDOPIA. See UDOPIA § 6(b)(l)
(amended 2002).
146 UDOPIA § 13(b)(2) (amended 2002).
147 See Badouh, 22 S.W.3d at 396.
148 See id. at 393.
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application is highly dependent on the facts of each case. The resulting
uncertainty is magnified by the relative lack of state law precedent in the
post-1976 era. Not surprisingly, federal tax rulings on acceptance ques-
tions are numerous and, to the extent state and federal standards of accep-
tance are similar, these rulings may be persuasive in state law situations.
Finally, UDOPIA depends on the existing law of acceptance and makes no
attempt to codify this still developing area of the law of disclaimers.
3. Disclaimers, Creditors, and Relation Back
As has been noted, even if the sunset provision of EGTRRA is re-
pealed, the gift tax will remain and Code section 2518 still will be relevant
for tax planning. But disclaimers are relevant in an additional situation. In
some cases, a proper disclaimer will keep the disclaimed property out of
the hands of the disclaimant's creditors. Many cases have held that, absent
some statutory provision preventing the result, a proper disclaimer will
prevent the disclaimant's creditors from reaching the disclaimed property.
These cases rest on the "relation back" doctrine. Although at common law
a creditor's claim may have attached to the property prior to the disclaimer
of an inheritance,'49 many courts have held the relation back language
means the disclaimer takes effect as a refusal at the time to which it relates
back, thus preventing the disclaimant from transferring the interest. It is
widely held, in turn, that this lack of transfer keeps the disclaimed property
out of the hands of creditors and prevents the disclaimer from being a
fraudulent transfer. 5 UDOPIA adopts this interpretation. Rather than
using the term "relates back," however, UDOPIA defines a disclaimer to be
a refusal.' 5' Section 2(3) sets forth the rules for the time a disclaimer takes
effect based upon interest being disclaimed.5 2  Section 5(f) states the
meaning of the relates back language: "A disclaimer ... is not a transfer,
assignment, or release."' 53 Taken together, those provisions continue the
established doctrine that a disclaimant does not transfer the disclaimed
149 See Coomes v. Finegan, 7 N.W.2d 729, 732-33 (Iowa 1943).
150 See, e.g., In re Estate of Hansen, 248 N.E.2d 709 (Ill. Ct. App. 1969); Essen v.
Gilmore, 607 N.W.2d 829 (Neb. 2000); In re Estate of Schiffman, 430 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sur.
Ct. 1980); Dyer v. Eckols, 808 S.W.2d 531 (Tx. Ct. App. 1991); Abbott v. Willey, 479
S.E.2d 528 (Va. 1997).
15 See UDOPIA § 2(3) (amended 2002).
152 See id. at § 6(b)(1) (amended 2002) (§§ 6(b)(1) (interests in property), 7(b) (jointly
held interests), 9 (powers of appointment), 10 (interests in appointees, objects, or takers in
default of powers of appointment) and 11 (powers held in a fiduciary capacity)).
153 Id. at § 5(f) (amended 2002).
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interest by making a disclaimer.'54
A few courts, however, have held otherwise. In 1940 the California
Supreme Court invalidated a disclaimer as a fraudulent transfer when done
to defraud a creditor, although the holding was later overturned by
statute. 55 A more recent example is the Ohio case of Stein v. Brown. 156 In
Brown a residuary legatee disclaimed his bequest while a wrongful death
action was pending against him.'57 He had previously transferred the
family home to his spouse for the sum of one dollar. 58 The court held that
a potential tort claimant was a creditor under the Ohio version of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and that the facts showed the dis-
claimer was made with actual intent to defraud.' 59 The disclaimer was
therefore a fraudulent conveyance as against the tort claimant and was to be
ignored. 160 The Supreme Court of Alabama reached the same conclusion
in Pennington v. Bigham.161 Pennington had obtained a default judgment
against Bigham and filed a certificate ofjudgment with the probate court. 62
About a year later, Bigham's father died intestate and Bigham disclaimed
all his interest in his father's estate.163 The court analyzed the disclaimer in
light of the law of fraudulent conveyances and held the disclaimer consti-
tuted a transfer to Bigham's son (who took as his grandfather's heir), and
because nothing in the record indicated that Bigham executed the dis-
claimer for any other reason than to keep the property from his creditor, the
disclaimer was void.164
154 See id.
155 Compare In re Estate of Kalt, 108 P.2d 401,404 (Ca. 1940) (invalidating legatees'
renunciation of interest in estate when they were made to defeat creditor's judgment) with
CAL. PROB. CODE § 283 (2003) (stating disclaimers by beneficiaries are not fraudulent
transfers).
156 See 480 N.E.2d 1121 (Ohio 1985).
157 See id. at 1121.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 1123-24.
160 See id. at 1124. But see Nielsen v. Cass County Soc. Serv. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157,
159 (N.D. 1986) ("Absent an express statutory provision to the contrary, a renunciation is
not treated as a fraudulent transfer of assets, and the renouncer's creditors [including social
services agency] cannot on that ground claim any rights to the renounced property.").
North Dakota later overturned the Nielson decision by enacting N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-
24.1-02 (2002).
161 See 512 So. 2d 1344 (Ala. 1987).
16 2 See id. at 1345.
163 See id.
164 See id. at 1346-47.
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In addition to the case law described above, some states have statutes
that bar disclaimers by an insolvent disclaimant' 65 Oregon has a statute
that bars a disclaimer when the disclaimant is indebted to the state for
fraudulently obtained public assistance.'66 The Oregon statute, adopted
when the state adopted UDOPIA, is indicative of one trend in the law of
disclaimers-the protection of public revenues. Even in states where the
relation back doctrine prevents creditors from reaching disclaimed prop-
erty, the doctrine will not prevent a disclaimer from being treated as a
transfer of assets for purposes of Medicaid qualification. Disclaimers by
recipients or potential recipients of Medicaid have led to litigation with
results that generally favor the state. The outcome of these cases often
turns on whether a state statute created the medical assistance program and
whether the litigation involves a redetermination of eligibility or an attempt
to recover reimbursement for assistance already provided.
One of the earliest cases involving disclaimers and public assistance
was decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court in 1980. In State v.
Murtha,'67 the sister of the decedent was the beneficiary of one-third of the
residuary estate under the decedent's will. 68 The sister received medical
benefits under Title XIX of the Social Security Act 169 for eleven years prior
to the decedent's death. 7 ' She disclaimed her interest in the residue. 7'
The Connecticut statute that established state participation in the federal
program and prohibited disposition of property by a recipient of aid
without the permission of state authorities was on the books when the
disclaimer statute was enacted. 72 The court applied canons of statutory
construction assuming that the legislature enacts statutes with due regard to
consistency with existing statutes, and stating that repugnancy is to be
avoided. 173 In doing so, the court found the usual language that disclaimers
relate back to the date of the decedent's death "must be considered as
operative only when there is no bar to the disclaimer"'74 such as that
165 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.801(6) (2003); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 191A
§ 8 (2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.532(c)(6) (2003).
166 See OR. REV. STAT. § 105.648 (2001).
167 See 427 A.2d 807 (Conn. 1980).
168 See id. at 808.
169 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396-1396k (2000).
170 See Murtha, 427 A.2d at 807-08.
171 See id. at 807-08.
172 See id. at 808.
173 See id. at 808-09.
174 Id. at 809.
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contained in the medical assistance statute. 7 5 The disclaimer, therefore,
was invalid and the disclaimant's eligibility for aid could be reassessed.'76
However, the disclaimed property could not be taken by the state as
reimbursement for benefits already properly paid because federal law
prohibits states from placing liens on the property of recipients of aid.'77
The holding in Murtha is unsurprising. Given the enormous financial
demands of the Medicaid program, courts are unlikely to look favorably on
attempts to create or maintain eligibility by deliberately rejecting assets that
could be used to pay for care. In fact, the federal Medicare Assistance
Handbook defines a transfer to include the waiver of an inheritance.'78
Several other states have followed Connecticut in refusing to recognize
disclaimers in the Medicaid context.
79
The same states that refuse to recognize disclaimers in the Medicaid
context recognize the relation back doctrine as applied outside of the public
assistance context. The Supreme Court of Nebraska made the point
explicitly in Essen v. Gilmore.8 ' The court's opinion in Essen reaffirms
the majority view of the operation of the relation back doctrine."'8 Because
by statute the disclaimer relates back to the time of the creation of the
disclaimed interest, the disclaimant never has the interest, never transfers
the interest, and therefore cannot possibly make a fraudulent transfer by
making the disclaimer. 182 The facts of the case are paradigmatic. The
Essens obtained a judgment against the Gilmores in July of 1996.83 Mr.
Gilmore's mother died in September 1997, and he executed a disclaimer
four months later.'84 In the meantime, the Essens filed a petition to satisfy
175 See id.; accord Dep't. of Income Maint. v. Watts, 558 A.2d 998, 1001-02 (Conn.
1989/76 See Murtha, 427 A.2d at 810.
177 See id.
178 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(e)(1) (2000).
179 See Troy v. Hart, 697 A.2d 113 (Md. 1997); Hoesly v. State, 498 N.W.2d 571
(Neb. 1993); Molloy v. Bane, 631 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); In re Matter of
Keuning, 593 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Hinschberger v. Griggs County Soc.
Serv., 499 N.W.2d 876 (N.D. 1993); Tannler v. Wis. Dep't. of Health & Soc. Serv., 564
N.W.2d 735 (Wis. 1997). But see In re Estate of Kirk, 591 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1999)
(stating valid disclaimer by executor of surviving spouse who was Medicaid beneficiary
prevents recovery by Medicaid authorities).
180 See 607 N.W.2d 829 (Neb. 2000).
181 See id.
182 See id. at 833.
183 See id. at 832.
184 See id.
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their judgment out of Mr. Gilmore's share of his mother's estate. 185 A
judgment in the lower court for the creditors was reversed on the law
because the debtor must acquire rights in the property transferred before
there can be a fraudulent transfer.186 The court held that because the
disclaimer related back, the disclaimant never had rights in the property
and did not make a transfer. 187 The court also held an earlier Nebraska
case, Hoesly v. State,188 which affirmed the disqualification of a recipient of
public assistance because he disclaimed his interest in his father's estate, is
inapposite to the situation in Essen.'89 The older case was decided on the
basis of the public assistance statute which provided a specific rule about
disclaimers applicable to the specific context.' 90
The Essen opinion reminds us that disclaimers need not have the same
effect in every situation. Just as traditional property law's "inherent
nature" of a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety should not answer the
question of whether a surviving joint tenant or tenant by the entirety can
disclaim, so the relation back doctrine does not mean the same thing in
every context. It is not surprising, then, that in a recent Supreme Court
case, the relation back doctrine failed once again.
The facts of Drye v. United States'9' are straightforward. Mr. Drye
failed to pay his taxes resulting in outstanding federal tax liens, in the
words of Code section 6321, on all of his "property and rights to
property."' 92 His mother died intestate, and he made a valid disclaimer
under state law of all his interest in her estate.193 Justice Ginsburg noted in
Drye that disclaimed inheritances are not among the list of exempt property
in Code section 6334(a) and disclaimers are not recognized in any of the
tax collection provisions, contrasting with the explicit recognition of
qualified disclaimers in Code section 2518. 194 The opinion goes on
however, trying to identify the state law right that constitutes "property or
a right to property" under federal law and counters the taxpayer's conten-
185 See id.
186 See id. at 832-34.
187 See id. at 834.
188 See 498 N.W.2d 571.
189 See Essen, 607 N.W.2d at 835.
190 See id.
191 See 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
192 Id. at 49 (citing I.R.C. § 6321 (2000)).
93 See id.
194 See id.
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tion that he had only a right to accept or reject a gift.'95 The opinion states
that the disclaimant had the right to channel the inheritance to the next
taker and to determine who takes the disclaimed property. '96 "This power
to channel the estate's assets warrants the conclusion that Drye held
'property' or a 'right[ ] to property' subject to the Government's liens,"' 19 7
Justice Ginsburg wrote, and just to make sure, repeated the statement: "The
control rein [Drye] held under state law, we hold, rendered the inheritance
'property' or 'rights to property' belonging to him within the meaning of
section 6321, and hence subject to the federal tax liens that sparked this
controversy."1
98
Justice Ginsburg's sweeping language calls into question the entire
relation back doctrine. Indeed, the opinion expressly rejects the argument
that by disclaiming the disclaimant is not directing the passing of the
property. The rejection of a death time gift cannot restore the status quo
ante because, unlike the donor of a lifetime gift, the decedent cannot make
a decision about the rejected property. Thus, even though the disclaimed
property passes according to a statute that references the deceased donor's
arrangements (or depends on the intestacy statute), the disclaimant "inevi-
tably exercises dominion over the property."' 99 Exercising dominion, of
course, means acceptance, and if one followed the reasoning of Drye to its
bitter end, it is impossible to disclaim so long as disclaimer is barred by
acceptance.
From one point of view, it would have been much better if the Drye
opinion had taken a different approach, under which the question would be
whether any provision recognizing the disclaimer in the tax lien context is
analogous to the recognition in the transfer tax context given by Code
section 2518. The answer is obviously "no." In the absence of such
recognition, would the federal government have to recognize a state law
disclaimer in the context of a tax lien? Jewett v. Commissioner suggests
the answer to that question also is "no."2 ° Jewett involved a husband who
"executed disclaimers of a contingent interest in a testamentary trust 33
years after that interest was created, but while it was still contingent."2°1
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 Id. at 61.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 See 455 U.S. 305 (1982).
201 See id. at 306.
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Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Jewett clearly states that the gift tax
reaches indirect transfers and that Jewett had no right to disclaim without
tax consequences absent the concession in the regulation, which then
governed this area."' The analogy would be that because lien provisions
are designed to reach all property interests, and there is a statutory list of
exempt interests, the disclaimer will not avoid the lien, absent a recognition
of disclaimers in the statute or regulations.20 3
The simple question serving as the heading for this Section-when are
disclaimers barred?-is better expressed: when may a disclaimer be
effective? Even as restated, this question does not have a simple answer.
The concept of acceptance is far from clearly defined. Few statutes address
the relationship between disclaimers and the disclaimant's debts generally,
but most of the law in the area involves public assistance and rests, at least
in part, on specific statutory provisions. Finally, the United States Supreme
Court's latest pronouncement on the effect of a disclaimer calls into
question the idea that disclaimed property passes from the donor to the
ultimate recipient without, in some metaphorical sense, touching the
disclaimant. 24 Therefore, the property law meaning of a disclaimer is far
from clear.2"5
IIl. CONCLUSION
This brief excursion through some of the property law questions that
arise in the law of disclaimers paints an unsettling picture. While the
workings of tax qualified disclaimers are fairly well established, other
202 See id. at 319.
203 See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Recent Wealth Transfer Tax Developments, ALI-ABA 118
(July 1997).
See infra text accompanying notes 199-200. Drye held that the disclaimant had
sufficient property interests in the disclaimed property for the federal tax lien to attach. 528
U.S. 49. However, the effect of the reasoning in Drye on other legal questions is far from
settled. See In re Kloubec, 247 B.R. 246 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000), aff'd, 268 B.R. 173
(N.D. Iowa 2001) (holding that Drye stood for the proposition that state law could not
control a federal statute and refusing to recognize the validity in a bankruptcy proceeding
of a pre-petition disclaimer, although other courts had done so). The district court affirmed
the bankruptcy court without deciding on the relevance of Drye, holding that the disclaimer
was invalid because the disclaimant had encumbered the disclaimed interest. Id. See also
In re Faulk, 281 B.R. 15 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002) (reviewing cases on disclaimers, held
that Drye was not relevant to the role of pre-petition disclaimers in part because in Drye the
federal tax lien had been filed before the disclaimer); In re Nistler, 259 B.R. 723 (Bankr. D.
Ore. 2001) (same).
205 The effect of the reasoning in Drye on other legal questions is far from settled.
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aspects of the law are not so well settled. Despite UDOPIA's effort to
answer some of the open questions, especially with regard to what can be
disclaimed, it neither attempts to codify the law of acceptance as a bar to a
disclaimer nor attempts to clarify the law of the insolvent disclaimant. The
policy issues involved in determining what may be disclaimed are far from
settled, as the variation among the law of the states suggests. Finally, the
Drye case has called into question the very rationale of the disclaimer.
Future development of disclaimer law awaits further events.

